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Abstract 
Many trust establishment solutions in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) rely on public key certificates. Therefore, they should 
be accompanied by an efficient mechanism for certificate revocation and validation. In order to reduce the hazards from nodes 
and to enhance the security of network we propose to develop a CA distribution and a Trust based threshold revocation method. 
Initially the trust value is computed from the direct and indirect trust values. And the certificate authorities distributes the secret 
key to al the nodes. Followed by this a trust based threshold revocation method is computed. Here the misbehaving nodes are 
eliminated. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. MANET 
MANET is a self-configuring system of mobile routers linked by wireless links which consequently combine to 
form an arbitrary topology. The mobility of the routers are provided randomly and organized themselves arbitrarily. 
MANET has various potential applications, such as emergency search-rescue operations, meeting events, 
conferences, and battlefield communication between moving vehicles and/or soldiers [1].  
MANET is a highly flexible network where nodes can freely move and join, with no fixed infrastructure, and 
thus it is vulnerable to attacks by malicious users. These types of attacks are basically unfeasible to detect, thus 
making it hard to produce security for such attacks [2]. 
1.2. Certificate system in MANET 
A large number of methods to detect various kinds of attacks have been developed for MANETs. Only detecting 
and blocking attacks in each node is not enough to maintain network security because attackers can freely move and 
repeatedly launch attacks against different nodes. 
To reduce the damage from attacks, attackers must be immediately removed from the network after detection of 
the first attack; this can be achieved by using a certification system. In networks with the utilization of a certification 
system, nodes cannot communicate with each other without a valid certification. In other words, any attacker cannot 
exist in the network once its malicious behavior has been detected by others and its certification has been revoked 
accordingly by the system. The performance of a certification system largely depends on its deployed certification 
revocation strategy [2].  
Issues  
 Inaccuracy 
 Slow revocation 
 Network overhead [2] 
1.3. Certificate distribution &revocation in MANET 
They are based on the determination of the trustworthiness of nodes, regarding their recommended functionality. 
The prime goal of rational nodes is to cooperate in order to avoid, or even mutually isolate, notorious nodes (i.e., 
selfish, malicious) from routine network operations. Such cooperation requires the exchange of recommendations 
and the identification of trusted recommenders [3]. 
The system which is identifying the attackers based on the information on the occurrence of attacks provided by 
nodes belonging to the network, the certificate of a legitimate user might be revoked by the false accusation from 
malicious nodes. Therefore, certificate revocation methods must be able to distinguish false accusations from valid 
ones. Also, malicious nodes must be immediately removed from accessing the network with a small operating 
overhead [2]. 
1.4. Problem and Solution 
In our first paper, we have proposed a trust based light weight authentication routing protocol in MANET. 
Initially a multipath route discovery technique is utilized that selects the path with maximum packet success ratio as 
optimal path for data transmission. For each node in the chosen path, global trust value is estimated based on direct 
and indirect trust values of the node. If the trust value of any node is below threshold value, then it is authenticated 
using the secret sharing technique. This authentication technique enhances the reliability, redundancy and network 
lifetime. 
In our second work, we have provided confidentiality and integrity to the messages which uses light weight 
techniques. We have used an algorithm for light weight encryption and decryption where nibbles are circulated in a 
counter so as to avoid sum nibble attack. Then, we implement an algorithm for providing availability with DoS 
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resilience. Also, message authentication code is generated and a hash function is applied to it. Then encryption is 
performed at source and decryption at destination. By this method, we can attain confidentiality and non-repudiation 
in addition to authentication.  
In our third work, we have proposed a secure multipath routing and transmission technique for MANET. The 
main objective of this work is to provide security not only for the multipath routing protocol but also for data 
transmission using these multiple routes. For secure route discovery, RREQ packets are signed using digital 
signatures [2]. When the destination receives first RREQ packets from the node, the destination verifies all the 
signatures and caches the route list by the session key of source node. Then it sends the RREP via same path to 
source. Finally if the signature is verified, the path is accepted. For secure transmission, the messages are 
fragmented and sent to destination via different routes. At the source node, the message parts are encrypted using 
soft-encryption and similar XOR operations. At the destination node, the received encrypted message parts are 
decrypted and the original message is recovered.  
2. Literature review 
G.A. Safdar and M. McLoone [4] have presented a novel Randomly Shifted Certification Authority 
authentication protocol (RASCAAL) for ad hoc networks. RASCAAL employs a trusted third party for 
authentication purposes which holds the public key certificates and acts as a certification authority (CA). 
RASCAAL has been developed to take into account the radio technology communication related characteristics of 
the underlying IEEE 802.11 MAC for ad hoc networks. This is achieved by integration with the CSMA/CA medium 
access rules to enable nodes to securely exchange messages for different transactions. To the best of author’s 
knowledge, RASCAAL is the first authentication protocol which proposes the concept of dynamically formed short 
lived random clusters with no prior knowledge of the cluster head. To achieve this, RASCAAL implements the idea 
of a random ACTIVE CA selection and CA role shift in the network. This property significantly enhances the 
overall security of the communicating nodes. 
P. Caballero-Gil and C. Hern´andez-Goya [5] have proposed an efficient public key management scheme that is 
suitable for fully self-organized mobile ad hoc networks where all nodes play identical roles. This approach implies 
that the operations of creating, storing, distributing, and revoking nodes’ public keys are carried out locally by the 
nodes themselves. The goal of the presented methods is the improvement in the process of building local certificate 
repositories of nodes. In order to do it, an authentication solution based on the web of trust concept is combined with 
an element of routing based on the multipoint relay concept introduced in the optimized link state routing protocol. 
Their proposal leads to a good tradeoff among security, overhead, and flexibility. In this scheme there is a 
considerable decrease in resource consumption while carrying out the certificate verification process. 
Wei Liu et al [6] has proposed a new method to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the certificate 
accusation and recovery mechanism by employing a threshold based approach to restore a node’s accusation ability 
and to ensure sufficient normal nodes to accuse malicious nodes in MANETs. This new method can effectively 
improve the performance of certificate revocation.  
Genevie`ve Arboit et al [7] have proposed a decentralized certificate revocation scheme that allows the nodes 
within a MANET to revoke the certificates of malicious entities. This certificate revocation scheme is based on 
weighted accusations; whereby a quantitative value is assigned to an accusation to determine its weight. The weight 
of the accusations from nodes that are considered to be trustworthy are higher than those from less trustworthy 
nodes. A certificate of a node is revoked when the sum of the weighted accusations against the node is equal to or 
greater than a configurable threshold (RT). The scheme mainly uses hash chains for providing data origin and 
integrity checks and it does not require time synchronization. The scheme is fully contained and it does not rely on 
inputs from centralized or external entities. 
Hui Xia et al [8] have presented a dynamic trust prediction model to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes, which 
is based on the nodes’ historical behaviors, as well as the future behaviors via extended fuzzy logic rules prediction. 
They have also integrated the proposed trust predication model into the Source Routing Mechanism. Their novel on-
demand trust-based unicast routing protocol for MANETs, termed as Trust-based Source Routing protocol (TSR), 
provides a flexible and feasible approach to choose the shortest route that meets the security requirement of data 
packets transmission. TSR improves packet delivery ratio and reduces average end-to-end latency. 
434   Banoth Rajkumar and G. Narsimha /  Procedia Computer Science  92 ( 2016 )  431 – 441 
Hisham Dahshan et al [9] have proposed scheme by which a master private key is split into n pieces according to 
a random polynomial. Each node in the proposed scheme is configured with a share ski of the CA private key SK, 
the node’s public key pki, and the CA public key PK before joining the network. Meanwhile, the master private key 
could be recovered by combining any threshold t pieces based on Lagrange interpolation. Consequently, the 
proposed scheme improves the safety levels in MANETs. The proposed hop-by-hop certificate revocation scheme is 
based on both threshold cryptography and transitive trust between mobile nodes. Because of the decentralized nature 
of our proposed scheme, it enables a group of legitimate nodes to perform fast revocation of a nearby misbehaving 
node. The proposed scheme is highly robust in the mobility environment of MANETs.  
3. Overview 
In this paper we have proposed to develop a CA distribution and a Trust based threshold revocation method. 
Initially the trust value is computed from the direct and indirect trust values. And the certificate authorities 
distributes the secret key to all the nodes. Followed by this a trust based threshold revocation method is computed. 
Here the misbehaving nodes are eliminated.  
3.1.  Trust based threshold revocation method 
A critical part of any certificate-management scheme is the revocation of misbehaving nodes. For centralized 
revocation, a central entity, such as the CA, is the only entity in the network that can take the revocation decision for 
a certain node. For decentralized revocation, the node revocation is done by the neighboring nodes of the 
misbehaving node. Any node in the network can calculate the value of trust in another node’s if there exists a 
recommended certificate chain between the two nodes. When a node exhibits misbehavior, one of the neighbors of 
the misbehaving node becomes a revocator node  
Here the trust value is computed from the direct and indirect trust values. 
3.2. Trust Computation 
In this phase, the direct (DTij) and indirect (IDTij) trust values of each node are estimated utilizing Eigen trust 
algorithm. Then a resolver is employed to estimate the global trust value of the node. [13] 
Direct Trust: 
Let RSS be the signal strength among Ni to Nj 
Each node (Ni) estimates Eigen vector centrality (Ci) of its neighbors using Eq (6). It is proportional to the sum of 
the nodes that are link to Ni.   
 Ci = ¦¦
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 where W(i) = set of nodes linked to ith node  
 n= sum of nodes  
 D = constant 
 Vi,j = adjacency matrix of the network (Refer Note(1)) 
This value gets updated once the node receives or sends a message to its neighbors.  
Each node periodically computes its connectivity rating (recent satisfaction index (RSI)) with each of its direct 
neighbor nodes using the below computed percentages (Using Eq (7))  
 RSIij = %f(i, j) – %e(i, j)                                                        (2) 
where %f (i, j) = percentage of packets initiated from Ni which were forwarded by Nj over the total number of 
packets provided to Nj.  
% e(i, j) = percentage of packets that were expired over the total number of packets given to Nj. 
Utilizing RSIij, the direct reputation DTij can be estimated as follows  
 DTij = DTij(pr) * X  + RSIij * (1-X )                    (3) 
Where DTij(pr) = previous trust value of Nj in Ni prior to inclusion of current RSIij value.     
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 X  = constant revealing the confidence level for Nj stored in Ni (Refer Note (2)) 
DTij is normalized using the Eq (9) 
DTij = 
 )DTmax()( ijtf
DTij
                                         (4) 
Where f (t) max is the function reflecting the maximum observation of DTij over time t.    
Note:  
1) For Eigen vector centrality,   
If Ni is linked to Nj  
Then  
  Vi,j = SS  
Else  
Vi,j = 0  
   2) If there is no link among Ni and Nj, then DTij is reduced using a constant E  instead of X  
Indirect trust  
IDTij is estimated from aggregated form of trust report received and processed by Ni about Nj which is shown 
below  
 IDTij = ¦
¦
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where )(nG = degree centrality of the reporting node (n) 
Resultant Global trust value (GTij) 
A resolver is employed that computes the resultant global trust value (GTij) of the node based on the direct and 
indirect trust values. It also executes trust noise cancellation mechanism (Ellaborated in Note (3)). 
 GTij = X * DTij + (1 -X ) * IDTij                            (6) 
Each node Ni monitors the trust values (GTij) of its neighbor nodes within its transmission range. Then it collects 
the trust values from the monitored nodes and exchanges the collected information with its neighboring nodes. 
Following the information exchange, if any node finds that the trust value of monitored node is below threshold, 
then the node is subjected to authentication. (Explained in section 3.3.3) 
Note (3): Trust Noise Cancellation  
Let Th be the pre-defined threshold defined based on the neighbor node mobility and link quality.  
Let PLR be packet loss ratio  
If (PLR (Ni) < Th) 
Then  
 Consider the packet loss to be noise  
 Lost packets are ignored.    
Else   
 The routes that is passing through respective Ni is prevented and alternate optimum path is chosen   
End if  
 
 The system can be initialized as follows: 
3.3. CA distribution  
The system can be initialized as follows: 
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1. CA picks a secret polynomial f(x) and set f(0) = SK, it is the secret to be shared (private key of CA). 
where     lxfxf t
i
i
i mod
1
1
¦
 
                                              (7) 
SK – secret key, f(x) – polynomial, if is the coefficient of variable ix in the polynomial f(x).  
2. Next to this CA computes a secret share  ii ufsk  , iu - node identity and I =1,2,…..n. this secret key is 
send to each node through a perfect private channel which is safe enough to protect.  
3. CA then verifies the data jF (a point on the elliptical curve), where jF = Gf j4 (j = 0, 1, . . . , t−1) and 
broadcasts it to the whole group.  
4. A node after receiving the secret key isk , checks with the following equation. If the test is unsuccessful, the 
secret key is dishonest.   
                      ¦
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Figure 1 Distribution of the secret key by CA 
3.4. Revocation process 
The misbehaving node is revoked in this revocation process.  
¾ When a node exhibits misbehavior, one of the neighbors of the misbehaving node volunteers to take the role of 
the revocation coordinator. 
 
Figure 2 Revocation request and reply 
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¾ The revocation coordinator broadcasts to all nodes in network a revocation request (RevReq). The RevReq 
packet as shown in Figure 3 contains revocation message (msg) which consists of the certificate of the 
misbehaving node, the reason for revocation, the current time stamp and the revocation coordinator signature on 
the entire message msg, and the revocation coordinator certificate. 
 
Figure 3 RevReq packet format 
¾ Any node receiving the RevReq containing the message msg verifies the signature of the revocation coordinator 
on msg using the revocation coordinator’s public key contained in its certificate and checks the time stamp to 
ensure the freshness of the message msg. If the verification succeeds the received node will send a revocation 
reply (RevRep) packet containing   
skisig
msgi  to the revocation coordinator as shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 RevRep packet format 
¾ When the revocation coordinator receives RevRep from a node, it searches the corresponding trust value of this 
node in its trust table and if the search yields that the trust value is greater than trust threshold (Tth), this node is 
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trusted and it can share in the revocation process. On the other hand, if the search yields that the trust value of 
the sender of the RevRep is below the trust threshold (Tth), this node will not contribute in the revocation 
process. 
¾ When the number of verified RevRep’s received by the revocation coordinator exceeds the threshold (t), the 
coordinator can reconstruct revocation message signed by the CA private key (SK) by using Lagrange 
Polynomial Interpolation by substituting in equations 3 and 4 as follows: 
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If x=0, then the revocation message signed by the CA private key (SK) can be recovered by equation 4 as follows 
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At this point, the revocation coordinator is able to revoke the misbehaving node by using revocation message 
signed by SK which is identical to private key of CA. 
¾ The revocation coordinator broadcasts a revocation result packet. The RevRes packet as shown in Figure 5 
contains ((msg) sigsk||Tstamp||coordinatorcertificate||sgncoord) to the neighboring nodes, where (msg) sigsk 
revocation message signed by SK, Tstamp is the current time stamp, and sgncoord is the signature of the 
revocation coordinator.  
 
Figure 5 RevRes packet format 
¾ Any node receiving RevRes checks the freshness of the time stamp Tstamp compared with that in msg to ensure 
that the revocation process is done in a timely manner, verifies the signature of the coordinator (sgncoord) using 
the coordinator’s public key included in its certificate. If the verification of RevRes succeeds, it forwards the 
RevRes to other nodes in the network. The dissemination of RevRes continues until the lifetime of the revoked 
certificate ends.  
3.5. Overall revocation process  
1. Initially the coordinator broadcasts the RevReq packet.  
2. All nodes receiving the RevReq packet sent the RevRep packet to the coordinator.  
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3. The coordinator receiving the RevRep checks for the trusted value, if the trusted value is greater than the 
threshold value the process ends. 
4. If not the coordinator broadcasts the RevRes packet.  
5. Finally the neighbor nodes receive the RevRes packet and forward to the other neighbors. 
4. Simulation Results  
4.1.  Simulation Parameters 
We use NS2 [10] to simulate our proposed Trust based Certificate Revocation for Secure Routing (TCRSR) 
protocol.. In our simulation, the mobile speed is varied as 5,10,15,20 and 25m/s. The area size is 1000 meter x 1000 
meter square region for 50 seconds simulation time.  
Our simulation settings and parameters are summarized in table 1  
Table 1: Simulation parameters 
No. of Nodes 50 
Area 1000 X 1000 
MAC 802.11 
Simulation Time 50 sec 
Traffic Source CBR  
Rate 50Kb 
Propagation TwoRayGround 
Antenna OmniAntenna 
Speed 5,10,15,20 and 25m/s 
Packet Size 512bytes 
 
4.2.  Performance Metrics 
We evaluate performance of the new protocol mainly according to the following parameters. We compare the 
TSR [8] protocol with our proposed TCRSR protocol. 
Average Packet Delivery Ratio: It is the ratio of the number of packets received successfully and the total number 
of packets transmitted. 
Average end-to-end delay: The end-to-end-delay is averaged over all surviving data packets from the sources to 
the destinations. 
Packet Drop: It is the number of packets dropped during the data transmission 
Resilience: It is the ratio between total number of packets dropped and total number of packets sent. 
4.3. Results & Analysis  
The simulation results are presented in the next section. The mobile node speed is varied from 5 m/s to 25 m/s 
with 5 attackers.         
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Fig 6: Speed Vs Delay 
 
Fig 7: Speed Vs Delviery Ratio 
 
Fig 8: Speed Vs Drop 
 
Fig 9: Speed Vs Resilience 
Figures 6 to 9 show the results of delay, delivery ratio, packet drop and resilience by varying the mobile speed 
from 5m/s to 25m/s for the CBR traffic in TCRSR and TSR protocols. When comparing the performance of the two 
protocols, we infer that TCRSR outperforms TSR by 47% in terms of delay, 96% in terms of delivery ratio, 72% in 
terms of packet drop, 42% in terms of resilience. 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper we propose to develop a CA distribution and a Trust based threshold revocation method. Initially the 
trust value is computed from the direct and indirect trust values. And the certificate authorities distributes the secret 
key to al the nodes. Followed by this a trust based threshold revocation method is computed. Here the misbehaving 
nodes are eliminated. 
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